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THE presentation of the first set of quarterly tables
marks the end of another phase in the development of money-flow
accounting. No one familiar with the accounts can fail to be im-
pressed by the magnitude of the effort required to produce them. I
am confident that the effort will prove to have been worthwhile.
There is a certain obvious analogy between the flow-of-funds accounts
and the national income accounts. There is also, I think, an analogy
between the reaction of economists to the existence of FOF data and
their reaction to the existence of national income data.National
income data had existed for many years before the appearance of
Professor Kuznets' monumental works in 1937 and 1938.But
interest in the national income accounts had to wait until the depres-
sion posed the problems of national income analysis in such a way
that they could no longer be neglected. In the same way, the flow-
of-funds data, which have been available for many years, have not
been used very much. Interest in their application has become much
greater since the revival of interest in monetary problems. Of course,
national income analysis had Keynes, and the Keynes of flow-of-
funds analysis has not yet revealed himself. In his absence, we shall
have to do our collective best to get full value out of the great effort
which has gone into the construction of the accounts.
I. Objectives of Flow-of-Funds Analysis
Broadly speaking, the object of flow-of-funds analysis is to trace in a
systematic way the connections between production, prices, expendi-
tures, and other variables in the so-called real system and the terms
and conditions on which funds can be raised in the financial markets.
The connection is, of course, a two-way one, since events in the real
sector affect the situation in the financial markets and events in the
financial markets affect the real sector.Indeed, the distinction
between the real system and the financial system is an artificial one,
since financial decisions are, in many cases, part of decisions relating
to expenditures, production, and prices.
The ultimate payoff of all financial and monetary analysis is
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mainly in its contribution to our knowledge of the interaction process
mentioned above (though some of us are, of course, interested in
financial conditions for their own sake).But the flow-of-funds
accounts promise to be particularly useful in the study of those
interactions because they give us data on changes in assets and
liabilities for the different sectors which are integrated and consistent
with the income-flow data for the same sectors.
The flow-of-funds accounts do not in themselves reveal anything
about the interactions we wish to study.Veblen used to tell his
fellow students that he had mastered German by staring at
until their meaning came to him. But we are not likely to unravel the
mysteries of finance by staring at the flow-of-funds accounts until
their meaning comes to us. To gain any real knowledge of financial
processes, we require a set of behavior equations, which account for
the expenditure, production, and portfolio choices of the various
actors in the system, to supplement the identities implicit in the
flow-of-funds accounts.But the existence of the accounts should
make it possible to implement a detailed and realistic market of
financial processes, which will give us a bigger payoff from a given
set of substantive theories about economic behavior. To put it
another way, the flow-of-funds accounts pose the problem of
explaining why the flows were what they were.
In this paper I shall try to sketch out in very broad outline the
nature of the processes by which supply and demand are brought into
balance in the money and capital markets.I have listed very briefly
some of the adjustment processes which can operate. But I have put
the major emphasis on the problem of arranging a model which does
justice to the complicated lag structure in a market where some of the
variables move very rapidly while others respond slowly.
Ii. Flow-of-Funds Analysis or Analysis of Process
of Balancing Supply and Demand
The problem of flow-of-funds analysis may be conceived of as an
explanation of the process by which the accounting identities implicit
in the accounts are satisfied, just as national income analysis might be
thought of as an explanation of the process by which the national
income identities are satisfied.Alternatively, we may think of the
problem as one of showing how supplies and demands are brought
into balance in financial markets. We do not, of course, observe the
supply and demand functions in these markets—we only observe the
outcome of the balancing process.
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We may either consider the supply and demand in the market for
each type of security or, by netting out, consider the supply and
demand for currency and demand deposits. Suppose that we consider
the amounts supplied and demanded (of either money or securities),
on the assumption that interest rates remain fixed throughout some
short period and that there is no change in the amount of demand
deposits and currency. Then, we could, given the necessary data on
the current-account operations and portfolio choices of each sector,
compute the amounts demanded and supplied for each type of
security.If we take the algebraic sum of the differences between
amounts supplied and amounts demanded, we will obtain the
difference between the amount of currency and demand deposits
supplied and the amount demanded (with opposite sign).
In simple markets in which only one kind of security is considered,
it is obvious that any reaction which increases the amount of demand
for securities decreases the demand for money, and conversely. In a
world with many different types of securities, however, changes in
interest rates may increase the demand for one type of security and
decrease the demand for another. This type of reaction may only push
a supply and demand imbalance from one submarket into another
without directly affecting any net imbalance in the supply and
demand for money. Of course, those processes may indirectly result
in an adjustment in the supply and demand for money. If initially
there should be balance in the market for short-term securities and
an excess supply of long-term securities, the market might be brought
into balance by a two-stage adjustment in which (1) a rise in long
rates induces some asset holders to try to sell short and buy long,
thereby raising short rates and (2) inducing cash holders to buy shorts.
Conceptually at least, we may think of situations in which there is
no net excess demand or supply for money but in which there are
imbalances in the net markets. Relative rate changes which induce
asset holders to move from one type of security to another wilt
remove these imbalances.
On the other hand, we may think of situations in which there is a
net excess demand for money. In that case the market can only be
brought into balance by market adjustments or sequences of adjust-
ments which have the effect of reducing the net demand for cash
balances.
A wide variety of market adjustments are available to eliminate
excess demands and supplies in submarkets when there is no net
excess demand for currency and demand deposits. But there is only a
limited set of adjustment processes which have a net effect on the
demand for or supply of cash. Each member of the set of adjustments
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may be brought into play by various other adjustments in the market
so that the adjustment processes which influence demand for or
supply of cash may be regarded as the end product of the market
adjustment processes.(The case in which there are imbalances in
the submarkets with no net excess demand for cash is then a special
one in which the adjustments originating in the submarkets just
cancel out.) Because of the special importance of the market adjust-
ments directly affecting the demand for cash, it may be useful to
list the most important ones with some comment on the other market
processes which bring them into play.
FACTORS INFLUENCING DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY
OF CURRENCY AND BANK DEPOSITS
An analysis of factors influencing supply and demand for currency
and demand deposits falls naturally under five headings: (1) flexi-
bility of the supply of demand deposits, (2) household substitution of
time deposits or securities for currency and demand deposits, (3)
corporate and state government liquid-asset management, (4) cash
holdings of financial intermediaries, (5) expenditure effects.
A. Supply of Bank Deposits
Even in the face of a fixed supply of owned bank reserves, the
volume of demand deposits shows very substantial flexibility. The
swing in net free reserves over the cycle is about $1 billion. From the
trough of a cyclical slump to the peak of the boom, then, commercial
banks increase the supply of demand deposits by about $5 billion
from a given owned reserve base (i.e. given total reserves less those
absorbed by time deposits). This process is somewhat obscured by
the fact that increases in bank reserves (or reductions in reserve
requirements) occur during slumps, generating not only a decline in
borrowing from the Federal Reserve and an expansion of excess
reserves, but also an expansion in deposits.During the boom,
demand deposits continue to expand in spite of the fact that reserves
are increasing very slowly or (allowing for absorption by time
deposits) even contracting slightly.
A part of this adjustment results from a more or less passive
response of banks, which do not keep their reserve position closely
linked to increases in demand for loans. (Since this does not involve
a movement of interest rates, a purist may say that the passive response
of banks to increased loan demand should be considered part of the
available supply of funds at initial interest rates rather than a response
to excess demand for funds.It does not, of course, make any
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difference which way we look at it so long as we recognize the existence
of this element of flexibility in the system.)
In addition, however, some part of the induced expansion may be
connected with adjustment pressures in the money market.
The absorption of excess, reserves may reduce the supply of federal
funds, so that the federal-funds rates rise to the discount rate,
inducing some banks to borrow from the Federal Reserve instead
of in the federal-funds market even though they have not expanded
loans.
When interest rates are rising, some banks may borrow so as to
carry securities to maturity rather than take capital losses.
When money is tight, New York banks raise their rates to dealers,
who then try to mobilize funds from other banks with excess reserves.
Rising interest rates may force bank dealers in municipal securities
to carry them longer than planned, or other underwriters may borrow
to carry an increased inventory. The resulting strain on reserves may
be absorbed by the use of excess reserves or by borrowing.
B. Household and Business Demand for Cash
The household demand for currency and demand deposits may be
expected to respond to changes in interest rates in two ways. On
the one hand, increases in rates paid by savings institutions may
induce households to shift liquid assets from demand deposit form
to time deposit form. On the other hand, increases in interest rates
or in stock yields (adjusted for expectations) may induce households
to buy marketable securities and draw down demand deposits (as
well as time deposits). In much recent discussion, the first possibility
has been considered almost to the exclusion of the second. Without
entirely deprecating the importance of the first, I have some reasons
for thinking that the second type of substitution may also be impor-
tant.For the moment, itis sufficient that changes in long-term
interest rates induce some substitution between demand deposits and
other financial assets.I have discussed the nature of the substitution
between household demand deposit holdings and other financial
assets in Note A, below.
A similar situation applies to corporate holdings of demand
deposits. We may suppose that corporations hold certain amounts of
liquid assets to cover themselves against the possibility of temporary
excesses of cash outflows over cash inflows from current operations,
to meet accrued tax liabilities, or because of advance financing of
plant and equipment expenditures.We may suppose. that the
amounts held are invariant with respect to the interest rate but that
the proportion held in demand deposit form varies inversely with the
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yields obtainable from holding Treasury bills, time deposits, or
commercial paper. We might also suppose, however, that the total
amount held varies (ceteris paribus) inversely with the long-term
bond rate as treasurers try to postpone borrowing for more favorable
conditiOns (of course, they might think .that rates will continue to
rise and, therefore, act in the opposite way).
A good deal has been said about corporate reactions to the bill
rate but I am not sure that corporate sensitivity to bill rates is really
very great. There is, however, some evidence that high bond yields
have an adverse effect on their liquidity position.
C. Expenditure Effects
A money market can be balanced if the demand for money (at
given income levels) has some interest elasticity to the interest rate
or if expenditures have some interest elasticity.In classical theory,
the demand for money was supposed to be inelastic to the interest
rate, and investment demand was supposed to be highly elastic.
Things have been turned around in recent years; and, as we have
already seen, there is almost certainly some interest elasticity of
demand for money.It has often been said that investment and
consumer expenditure are not interest elastic or, at least not much so.
High or rising interest rates may, however, have an adverse effect
on expenditures in several ways. First, high interest rates per se may
cause some marginal projects to be abandoned or postponed in the
orthodox way. This may not be very probable in the manufacturing
or the utilities field, but may be of more significance in commercial
construction, where margins are thinner and leverage very high.
Unfortunately, there is little evidence one way or another on this point.
There is fairly strong evidence that high interest rates can choke
off residential building through their effect on the supply of funds for
insured and guaranteed mortgages.
It is also frequently suggested that expenditures are held down by
bank rationing of credit to marginal borrowers. Once again, the
evidence is unsatisfactory. In spite of the unsatisfactory state of the
evidence, we are safe in concluding that interest rate movements have
a fairly substantial effect on expenditures through their effect on
residential building and that they have at least marginal effects on
some other types of investment expenditures.
III. Multistage Processes
When we deal with the problems of equilibrium analysis, we do not
have to worry much about the timing of action and reaction in the
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markets with which we deal. But when we turn to analysis of the
processes by which equilibrium is (or might be) established, we are
beset with timing problems. One man cannot react to another man's
action until after it has taken place, and in process analysis we must
always be explicit about the lapse of time before the reaction. That
means that a theory which explains the dynamic processes in the
market must contain considerably more information than the
corresponding equilibrium theory. In addition, there are always some
difficulties in setting up a dynamic analysis involving complex lags in
a way which makes the results comprehensible. There is considerable
danger that simplifications of the lag structure designed to make
analysis manageable will distort the substance of the analysis. This
has been true to some extent in the rather simplified models pur-
porting to explain the "loanable-funds" theory of interest.In those
models, it is usual to assume that financial markets are brought into
equilibrium (for given values of expenditure flows) instantly or in the
shortest time interval recognized on the model. The interest rate thus
established is then taken to influence the expenditure flows in the
next period.
Now supply and demand are in some sense balanced in the financial
markets in very short periods. But it is certainly not true, as these
models imply, that money and capital markets are continuously in
equilibrium (even for given values of income flows).The models
alluded to use only one or two open-market interest rates, and take
no account of reaction lags by lenders or borrowers.In fact, of
course, there are many types of interest rates, and while some of them
r.espond very quickly to market conditions, others respond very
slowly.
The rates paid by savings institutions, for example, change very
slowly, and the average of these rates must be regarded as responding
to a moving average of the bond and mortgage yields in which the
institutions invest (though it must be noted that some of these rates
remain constant, and then jump suddenly when administrative rulings
of regulatory authorities change). The movements of these rates
may be very important in mobilizing and channeling funds through
the securities markets over a long period, but they play a relatively
small role in the short-run adjustment of supply and demand for
money and securities.
The rates charged for conventional mortgage loans move much
more quickly than the rates paid by savings institutions; but they
lag behind the open-market rates, and move with a somewhat smaller
amplitude. Moreover, their role in the short-period adjustment of
supply and demand is greatly reduced by the advance commitment of
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funds. Even in the case of a direct negotiation between an individual
household and a savings and loan association or mutual savings
bank, a couple of months will usually elapse between the making of
the commitment and the actual payment by the lender. Events in the
securities markets in the meantime may direct the lender to change his
policy with regard to new commitments, but that will only influence
his need for funds to meet mortgage commitments a couple of
months later.
In addition, the hard-up marginal buyer faced with an unexpected
change in rates will shop around until he finds a lender whose rates
are below average. This will help to equalize rates, but the possibility
reduces the effectiveness of changes in mortgage rates in bringing
supply and demand into balance in short periods.
Finally, we must recall that houses are built on credit. Even if
mortgage rates rise and prevent some people from buying houses,
the first effect is to lock the builder into his construction loan and
prevent him from starting another house.This will reduce the
demand for funds at a later date but not immediately.
The open-market rates for corporate and municipal bonds may
have an effect on the balance between supply of and demand for
funds in two ways. On the one hand, rate increases may discourage
borrowers; and, on the other hand, they may encourage individuals
or institutions who are not fully invested to buy. Ordinarily, plans
to issue bonds are made a fairly long time in advance of the actual
date of sale, and small changes in rates will not cause their cancella-
tion or postponement. Large changes in rates do, of course, lead to a
certain number of postponements of issues already arranged for and
for a possibly larger (though quite unknown) number of issues planned
but never formally scheduled for issue. To the extent that such post-
ponements occur in response to short-period changes in yields, the
yield changes do contribute to the short-period adjustment of supply
and demand. However, it is probable that such postponements fill
only a small part of the gap.
These are only examples, but their force should be sufficient to
make it clear that many of the adjustments which are most important
in offsetting a systematic tendency toward excess demand for money
over long periods are relatively ineffective in the short run. Some
others, which are not so important in the long run, have much
greater relative importance in the short period. This suggests that
any realistic analysis of adjustment processes in the financial markets
must be a multistage one. In a period as short as a month or even a
quarter of a year, most of the variables which account for the
variation in amounts of funds supplied and demanded must be taken
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as predetermined by flow variables in previous periods or by prices
and initial stocks of assets and liabilities at the start of the period.
The events of the period will produce changes in the values of the
flow variables, in asset stocks and liabilities, and in prices; and these
changes will have (1) a direct effect on amounts of funds supplied
and demanded in the next period and (2) an indirect effect through
some of the more slowly moving variables mentioned above.
To.put it more concretely, we can start the analysis of short-period
supply and demand adjustments by assuming that virtually all final-
product expenditures and production schedules are predetermined in
the sense that they depend on lagged flow variables or beginning-of-
the-period stOcks, with reaction to changes in stock or flow variables
within the period being negligible. Second, we can assume that most
of the borrowing plans for the period are determined by prior events
..—initial asset and liability positions, expected cash flows estimated
from previous flows, expected interest rates based on initial interest
rates. We can suppose, I think, that the amounts that people wish to
borrow during the period are not much changed by the deviation of
actual from expected cash flows during the period. We must, how-
ever, allow for the possibility that some borrowing will be postponed
if interest rates rise sharply during the period. (The postponement
function must be taken to be a one-sided one, i.e. borrowing will be
postponed by a fall in interest rates but not brought forward by a fall,
and its elasticity should be lower than the elasticity of planned
borrowing to expected interest rates. We should also allow for the
possibility that borrowing plans postponed by rising rates will be
reactivated by a fall in rates.)
We can also assume that the lending policies of intermediaries
during the period are predetermined. That does not mean that they
are unchanged from the previous period or constant throughout the
period. It only means that the changes are reactions to events which
have already happened at the start of the period, not to changes in
interest rates or asset positions during the period. Some borrowers
who have made their plans on the basis of earlier lending policies
may, therefore, be disappointed. They may have to pay a higher rate
than expected, or voluntarily borrow less than the planned amount,
or be refused their loan wholly or partially.However, their dis-
appointment depends on what has already happened to interest rates
in open markets or to portfolio positions of lenders before the start
of the period in question. These are, of course, only simplifying
assumptions which cannot be literally true. But because of the lag
between commitments and take-downs and the time lag in policy
formulation, the feed-back from changes in open-market interest
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rates and within-the-period portfolio changes to the plans and
policies of lenders and borrowers (except through postponement of
open-market issues) must be quite weak even for a period as long as
three months and certainly for a period as short as one month.
Finally, we can safely assume that the rates offered by savings
institutions, though they may change in response to prior events, will
not respond to changes in market yields during the period. The flow
of funds to savings institutions will, therefore, depend on income
(itself determined by lagged variables) and interest rates paid, which
are determined by past events. However, the flow may be reduced or
increased to the extent that variations in the rate of sale of marketable
securities to households are reflected in time deposits. We may also
take the flow of funds through life insurance companies and self-
administered pension funds as given.
It may be taken for granted that nonbank financial institutions will
make it their business to remain fully invested and that short-run
variations in their cash positions will not be very important. They
will invest all the funds they receive during the period and no more.
Differences between cash inflow and cash outflow implied by their
commitments and policies with respect to direct lending will have to
be rectified either by purchase or sale of government securities or by
variation in the amount of other open-market securities (primarily
new issues, except for equity purchases).
Suppose for the moment that open-market interest rates were
unchanged for the period. Then there would presumably be no
voluntary postponements of open-market issues.If we added up all
the increases and decreases in cash balances implied by the assump-
tions made above, we would certainly find that the sum was different
from zero.If the net demand for cash on a constant interest rate
assumption is positive, and bank reserves expand just enough to
balance off the absorption of reserves required for increased time
deposits, how is the gap to be filled?
IV. Short-Run Adjustments
Our assumptions have ruled out many of the responses to excess
demand which are important over longer periods. In the short run,
the market must rely on a number of marginal adjustments. The gap
between supply and demand for money at fixed interest rates might,
to judge from quarterly changes in cash balances, be as large as
$2 billion.
Because excess demand for money is only likely to occur at a time
when commercial and consumer loan demands are expanding, a part
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of the gap will be filled by expansion of bank assets, unless banks are
already operating at full stretch.Part of this expansion will be
balanced by sales of federal securities, but part of it will be met and
made possible by a reduction in net free reserves. A second closely
related process is connected with the inventory problems of under-
writers and dealers handling new issues of corporate and municipal
securities.If there is a net shortage' in the flow of funds into the
market, it may first be felt by dealers and underwriters, who find that
securities do not move as quickly as expected. Once the situation is
recognized, dealers and underwriters will arrange for better yields in
the deals they undertake.Meanwhile, however, they will have
accumulated inventory, which they may wish to hold until the
market improves. Some of this inventory will be financed by bank
loans, and this will have the same tendency to cause a fuller use of
bank reserves and bank borrowing as the rise in business loans
discussed above.
The tightening of bank reserve positions, particularly in New York,
may cause New York banks to raise rates to government bond
dealers and cause them to seek funds elsewhere—either from other
banks or by borrowing directly on repurchase agreements from the
larger corporations. (This may seem to be in conflict with what was
said above about corporate sensitivity to short rates. However, the
statement just given applies only to large corporations, and the
volume of funds is small relative to the total holdings of corporations.)
In addition, underwriters who are pinched by the situation may
redouble their selling efforts, and mobilize funds which would other-
wise be idle without much of an interest rate change.
No doubt there are other adjustment processes of this gleaning
type which help to clear the market in the very short run, and these
are meant to serve merely as examples.
Beyond this, the impact of a shortage of funds must be felt in the
market for long-term bonds in terms of rising yields.Rising bond
yields may cause some postponements of issues;and this will
automatically reduce cash balances, since the issuers are likely to
finance planned future expenditures, not current ones (the reduction
is not one for one, however, since the issuers might have bought
Treasury bills to hold pending expenditure of the proceeds). Alter-
natively, individual investors may be attracted to the new issues and
draw down demand deposits.The connection may be indirect.
Pension funds may be induced to buy bonds rather than stocks,
while individuals buy new stock issues.Finally, of course, the
Treasury may respond to the situation by selling shorts rather than
longs, thus taking pressure off the long market and putting it on the
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short. The resulting rise in short rates may encourage banks to hold
more of their shorts and tighten reserve positions still further.
Again, these are only examples of the many complicated marginal
adjustments which may be brought into play to remove short-period
imbalance between supply and demand.
V. Longer-Run Adjustments
If we suppose that the tendency for excess demand for funds persists,
we must obviously look elsewhere for processes which will bring
supply and demand into equilibrium. Some of the processes men-
tioned in connection with short-run adjustments can be repeated
over and over, but only up to a point. Bank reserve positions can be
squeezed a little bit each quarter for several quarters, but there is
clearly a limit, established by technical limits on the mobilization of
excess reserves and by the ban on continuous borrowing from the
Federal Reserve. Dealers may become cumulatively more efficient in
extracting idle funds from corporate treasurers, but only up to a point.
Postponed security issues may accumulate (with new postponements
each quarter exceeding previously postponed issues brought to
market), but only at the expense of reductions in corporate liquidity,
which must ultimately lead to new decisions about investment
programs. The market does not use up all its slack in one quarter,
but unless the excess demand is very small, it cannot work on,
using up slack indefinitely.
A one-time• increase in long-term yields will have continuing
effects, both directly and indirectly. Aside from the one-shot mobili-
zation of idle demand deposits, a higher level of yields may cause a
continued flow out of household demand deposits (or a reduced
flow into) for a long time.
In addition, the rise in long rates will tend to pullrates paid
by savings institutions and, therefore, cause a shift of demand deposits
toward time deposits as well as a reduction in the proportion of
additions to transactions balances going into demand deposits.
Third, the rise in long rates will lead to an increase in conventional
mortgage interest rates or a tightening of downpayment and maturity
standards.More important, itwill reduce the attractiveness of
guaranteed and insure.d mortgages subject to maximum interest rates.
The result will be a reduction in the rate of residential construction
and, ultimately, a reduction in the rate of growth of income (corn-
pared with what it would have been with easier money). The results
will not show up, however, for many months because of commit-
ment lags and lags in the reaction of builders to changes in the rate
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of sale of houses. A reduction in the rate of growth of income will,
of course, reduce the rate of growth of transactions balances, and
help to reduce excess demand for money.
Meanwhile, the tightening of bank reserve positions as well as the
increase in interest rates may cause banks not only to raise interest
rates but to reduce loan maturities or refuse marginal loans. This
may, in turn, reduce the expenditure of the would-be borrowers.
The increased cost of funds may cause the postponement or can-
cellation of some state and local expenditure projects.Similarly,
corporations may be induced to put off expenditures until more
favorable terms for raising funds can be obtained.
Of course, several turns of the interest rate screw may be required
before the excess demand is eliminated; and, in the meantime, all
sorts of things may happen in the real-expenditure sector;so the
market is always likely to be adjusting to either excess demand or
excess supply.This somewhat inadequate account of the time-lag
problems in flow-of-funds analysis can serve only *toindicate some
of the broad outlines of a flow-of-funds model.
Note A. Household Demand for Currency and
Demand Deposits
The theory of asset management for households suggests that the
division of household assets between demand deposits and time
deposits (whether at commercial banks, mutual savings banks, or
savings and loan associations) or fixed-value bonds (United States
savings bonds) ought to be sensitive to the interest rates paid on
time deposits and savings bonds. If we consider households which
do not buy marketable securities, the argument is based on the fact
that to earn interest on time deposits or savings bonds one must
forego the convenience of holding funds in a checking account. As
the proportion of financial assets held in time deposit form increases,
the number of trips to the bank to make transfers to a demand
deposit account so as to write checks will increase. And as the
interest rates paid on time deposits increase, the amount of that kind
of effort which seems worthwhile will also increase; so the propor-
tiori of household assets held in time deposit form should increase
with the interest rates.
For households which do buy marketable securities there is a
three-way choice between demand deposits, time deposits, and
securities. For simplicity, we may consider their portfolios divided
into two parts.One part is held against short-term income and
expenditure variations and for precautionary reasons, is always in
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deposits of some kind or in savings bonds, and is divided among
these forms on the same basis as the assets of nonsecurity buyers. The
remainder is available for risk investment. Most of this remainder
will be invested in securities or other variable-price assets, but at
any one moment there will be a number of people who are wholly or
partially "out of the market."
If these people knew that they would stay out of the market for a
long time, they would no doubt leave their funds in time deposits or
savings bonds. But many of those who are liquid at a given moment
have just sold a security for some reason connected with their judg-
ment about that particular security, and expect to reinvest in a short
time. The expected yield on a time deposit may therefore be small
even on a large sum and, if the holders are in high tax brackets and
oriented toward capital gains, may not be considered. (One might
expect such funds to be left with brokers, but customers balances
amount to only about $1 billion, which is far too small in relation to
the volume of security trading to account for the liquid assets
associated with it.)
We might expect that the proportion of these liquid assets held in
demand deposits would vary inversely with time deposit interest rates.
But we should also expect that if the volume of securities sold to
households exceeds the current flow of savings by potential security
buyers (a small subclass of households), then there would be a reduc-
tion in both time and demand deposits. Thus, a rise in the volume of
new stock issues or municipal bond issues may pull funds out of
demand as well as time deposits. A rise in the yields of corporate
and federal government bonds relative to time deposit rates may have
the same result.
There are some reasons for thinking that the pool of uninvested
funds held in demand deposits is quite large and that it does respond
to the volume of security sales.According to the Federal Reserve
Deposit Ownership Survey there were on January 30, 1957 almost
$30 billion of individual (personal) demand deposits.Of this
amount, 46 per cent was in accounts of over $5,000; 14 per cent in
accounts of over $25,000;and 6 per cent in accounts of over
$100,000. No doubt some of these accounts were really in the nature
of business accounts, but on the other hand the concentration of
deposit ownership is greater than the survey indicates because some
persons have more than one account. Some of these accounts repre-
sent the assets of individuals who do not trade much in marketable
securities and who for some reason do not find it worthwhile to take
the trouble to obtain time deposit interest. But it seems reasonable to
suppose that several of the $13 billion held in accounts of over
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$5,000 belong to persons who are looking for suitable investment.
If the amount were $10 billion, it would be less than 3 per cent of the
bonds and stocks held by households.
If this pool of funds were fixed in amount, its existence would be
of little consequence. However, there is also some reason to think
that variations in the volume of security sales to household are
negatively associated with variations in the rate of increase of
demand deposits. These indications are far from conclusive and are
reported only for their suggestive value. We fitted regressions of
changes in demand deposits of households to variables called
"financial saving" (increase in financial assets in flow-of-funds
accounts) and "security sales" (net increase in financial assets of
households excluding life insurance reserves and net investment in
unincorporated business). The demand deposit data were adjusted
by subtracting from the original figures a rough estimate of transac-
tions requirements, obtained by using the 1929 ratio of demand
deposits to disposable income. The series used covered 1924—29,
1936—40, 1947, 1949, and 1951—57. Goldsmith's data were used for




where=changein demand deposits adjusted for transactions
requirements
=financialsaving, also adjusted for transactions require-
ments
=securitysales
R was .55. A similar regression for time deposits had, as expected,
the complimentary coefficients
Y2 =0.9)11—0.5)12
where= changein time deposits
R was .68 (22 observations).
In another similar regression, using only the years 1920—29 and
1950—57 (15 observations), the results were similar
y1= O.OSX1—0.5x2
R=.68.
Since the components Yi, mustadd up tothere is some
problem in interpreting the results.
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If the three categories of saving were independent random variables,
and financial saving their sums, we should, of course, find some
correlations between any one of them and two others.Since our
correlations were not very impressive anyway, we cannot take the
fact of correlation very seriously.
The coefficients and some additional information about the time
pattern of the data are, however, consistent with a rather simple
hypothesis about deposit-holding behavior. Suppose that (1) a large
proportion of people put all their funds except for transaction
requirements into time deposits, (2) the rest normally invest most of
their funds on balance in securities, splitting the remainder about
equally between time and demand deposits (doing so by making
deposits as new savings accrue and securities are sold, and withdrawals
as securities are purchased—the net difference between withdrawals
and deposits on account of security sales being equal to net purchase
of securities by households). Then if net security sales were fixed,
we should expect that variations in financial saving would mostly be
reflected in time deposits because a sizable proportion of savers use
only time deposits; some of the saving of the other group goes into
securities and only half the remainder into demand deposits. The
high regression' coefficient of time deposits on financial saving and
the low one for demand deposits thus conforms to expectations.
Now suppose that there are periods when financial saving is rather
low.Interest rates (net of taxes) are low; so those interested in
securities pile up a substantial amount of liquid assets, divided about
equally between time and demand deposits.If security sales then
rise to levels in excess of financial saving for this group, it will draw
about equally on both time and demand deposits.If we suppose
that liquid assets for this group were built up during the First World
War and reduced during the security boom of the twenties, and built
up again during the thirties and Second World War, to be reduced
again in the fifties, we shall not be surprised at the 0.5regression
coefficients for time and demand deposits against security sales.
As I have already suggested, this hypothesis implies that an
increase in stock issues or municipal bond issues or a rise in the
yields of government and corporate bonds will draw funds from
demand deposits and, therefore, help to eliminate excess demand for
funds.
It also has some implications with regard to the sensitivity of
transactions holdings to time deposit interest rates. On theoretical
grounds we expect the proportion of "transactions" balances held in
the form of demand deposits to fall as time deposit interest rates
rise.That expectation seems to have been nicely confirmed in the
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postwar years. Household holdings of demand deposits and currency
has risen relatively slowly since the war while, time deposits plus
saving bond holdings have risen much more rapidly.Moreover,
savings bond holdings have risen little, and their interest rates have
lagged, while savings and loan deposits with the best interest record
have risen more than other time deposits. The 1957 changes in rates
permitted on commercial bank time deposits met with a good response.
Finally, a number of studies of deposit movements for individual
institutions suggest that the customers are sensitive to time deposit
yields in choosing the form in which they hold funds.
This evidence is very impressive and it would be hard to deny that
there is some connection between demand deposit holdings and time
deposit yields.But another interpretation is also at least possible.
Suppose that holders of time deposits are sensitive to relative yields
on different types of time deposits but that there is only a mild
elasticity of substitution between demand and time deposits.But
suppose, also, that at the war's end there was a large pool of demand
deposits held by those who are interested in marketable securities
and that the pooi has not only not grown but has actually declined.
In that case, transaction holdings of demand deposits could have
risen more or less in proportion to income, while total demand
deposits rose much more slowly.
One additional item of evidence in support of this view is worth
citing.Itis reasonable to suppose that accumulations of time
deposits and savings bonds represent, in large measure, the savings
of, say, the holders of the lowest 95 per cent of income reserves.
Most of their saving is either in this form or. in the form of housing
equity. Since the war, the sum of increases in time deposits, savings
bonds, and increase in housing equity has been a fairly steady
proportion of disposable income. It was also a fairly steady propor-
tion of disposable income during the 1920's, but the ratio of this type
of saving to disposable income was lower than it has been in the
postwar years. The increase in the ratio of this type of saving to
disposable income was of about the magnitude one might expect,
in view of the change in income distribution.
It seems to me that we are safe in concluding that interest rate
movements since the war have reduced the household demand for
demand deposits and that this has come about partly through shifts
from demand deposits to time deposits, but also through shifts from
demand deposits into marketable securities. The relative importance
of the two types of shifts is not easily evaluated, but there is some
reason to think that the shift into marketable securities has been of
substantial, if not dominant, importance.
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COMMENT
JAMES TOBIN, Yale University
I am wholly in accord with Professor Duesenberry's picture of a
set of interrelated financial markets, with flow-of-funds accounts as
the ex post record of the processes by which supplies and demands
for various financial assets are balanced. And I find his catalogue of
short- and long-run adjusting mechanisms in these markets extremely
instructive and suggestive. The structure of interest rates, from the
conventional zero on currency to the ratio of expected earnings to
common share prices, is the principal mechanism. But Duesenberry
rightly emphasizes the importance of auxiliary financial mechanisms,
especially in the short run.In the long run, financial markets are
equilibrated not only by interest rates and other financial variables
but by feed-backs from the "real" sector into financial supplies and
demands; disequilibrium in financial markets has repercussions on
output and prices, and changes in these real variables assist interest
rates in eliminating the disequilibrium. The revival of concern for
monetary and financial institutions and policies reflects a heightened
conviction of the importance of two-way connections between the
financial and real sectors.Flow-of-funds accounts are becoming
available at a propitious time.
However, the emphasis both of flow-of-funds statistics and of
Duesenberry's paper seems to me misplaced in one fundamental
respect.The supply and demand functions for financial assets,
which occupy the central place in Duesenberry's model, should be
stated in terms of stocks as well as flows. The basic behavior behind
the flow of funds is the adjustment of the balance sheets, or portfolios,
of individuals, business firms, and financial enterprises toward a
desired allocation of wealth among holdings of various assets and
debts.In this adjustment, the basic decision variables are stocks;
and flows will be dominated by attempts to adjust stocks to changes in
total wealth, interest rates, and other determinants.In the late
forties, for example, almost all financial behavior units were holding
excessive liquid assets relative to real assets; both the flow-of-funds
accounts and other economic records of the period can be understood
as consequences of the processes that restored portfolio balance. In
general, there will not be stable relationships among flows or between
flows and interest rates without allowance for the effects of stocks.
Duesenberry remarks that the Keynes of flow-of-funds analysis has
yet to reveal himself.If Duesenberry's analogy to national income
accounts is meant to imply that relationships among flows and among
flows alone, as useful as Keynes's consumption function, are waiting
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to be detected in the financial sphere, the new Keynes will be long
delayed. The statistical moral of this basic theoretical point is that
flow-of-funds accounts should be supplemented by balance sheets of
equal detail. Moreover, as soon as flows are regarded as a mechanism
for adjusting stocks, it must be recognized that they are not the only
mechanism.Stocks are altered also by capital gains and losses;
flows of funds cannot be properly interpreted without attention to the
simultaneous changes in valuation of assets.
Although Duesenberry's paper is devoted to the mechanisms that
remove disequilibrium in financial markets, he fails to specify clearly
the initial sources of disequilibrium he has in mind. It may be useful
to distinguish between (1) shifts in portfolio preferences and (2) changes
in supplies of the basic constituents of private wealth. Private wealth
is generally growing as a result of private capital formation or
government dissaving or both. The market must not only balance
total investment and total saving, but kinds of investment and kinds
of saving. There will, in general, be discrepancies between the forms
of increase of private wealth engineered by investors and the forms in
which savers wish to hold their increases in net worth. It is the func-
tion of changes in the interest rate structure to eliminate these
discrepancies.But there is normally, thanks to financial inter-
mediaries, a considerable automatic congruence between the com-
position of saving and that of investment;so little short-period
adjustment in the structure of ratesis required.Consider the
following examples:
(1) Individuals invest in their own businesses.
(2) Savers choose to hold increases in net worth in bank deposits,
if only in part and temporarily, pending placement of the funds
elsewhere; a corresponding amount of investment is in additions to
inventories, financed by bank loans.
(3) Financial institutions, e.g. insurance companies, savings and
loan associations, and pension funds, plan placements of funds in
line with the expected growth of their liabilities.But if there are
divergences from expectations—e.g. insurance companies get excess
funds in relation to planned placements, and savings and loan
associations have deficiencies—there are residual assets (cash and
government securities) that can be shifted among institutions to
absorb these discrepancies.
I welcome the unobtrusively stated heresy of Duesenberry concern-
ing the determination of the quantity of bank deposits. Our text-
book theory is that the supply of bank deposits does not adjust in
response to depositors' and borrowers' preferences, but is normally
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determined by the supply of bank reserves. In this respect, banks are
distinguished sharply from other financial intermediaries, whose
liabilities are regarded as variable in response to public preferences.
Duesenberry properly blursthis time-honored distinction, and
regards the quantity of reserves to which the banks are "loaned up"
as partly within the control of the banks themselves. In consequence.
the volumes of bank loans and deposits are themselves adjusting
variables, rather than constants to which interest rates and other
variables must adjust. For example, if the public should shift from
cash to assets held by banks, the reduction in the profitability of these
assets provides the banks with an incentive to curtail their asset
holdings and to acquiesce in the reduction of their deposits. To make
the example more specific, a shift by the public from deposits to
Treasury bills, lowering bill yields, reduces the incentive of banks to
borrow reserves from the Federal Reserve so long as the discount
rate is held constant.
Duesenberry does not believe that corporate bill holdings are
sensitive to bill yields in the short run.Evidently, much of the
economy of cash to which the secular increase in short-term rates
since the war has driven business firms is quite irreversibly institu-
tionalized. But the clear evidence of an inverse relation between the
transactions velocity of cash and the short-term rate suggests that
considerable sensitivity still remains.
Demand deposits of households, I agree, depend not only on the
interest rate on time deposits but also on security yields and turn-
over. New savings are initially in cash form, and portfolios tend by
themselves to turn into cash as interest and dividends accrue and
securities mature.It takes active management, with attendant costs
of decision-making and of transactions, to keep the cash proportion
down. Hence, the demand for cash depends on the costs of these
financial decisions and transactions in relation to the level of yields
and to the rewards from frequent shifting. Duesenberry's hypothesis
is plausible, even though his statistical method for supporting it is
vulnerable to the criticisms he himself suggests. An analogy may
make this vulnerability clear.In a study of the substitutability of
margarine for butter, one should not use the quantity of butter
consumption to "explain" margarine consumption but rather relate
both consumption quantities to the relative prices of the two
substitutes.
Shifts between cash and bills, or between the liabilities of various
intermediaries, are relatively easy adjustments for financial markets
to absorb. But shifts between financial assets fixed in money values,
on the one hand, and equities, inventories, and durable goods, on
192A PROCESS APPROACH TO ANALYSIS
the other, are much more difficult. The capacity and speed of finan-
cial adjustments to such shifts should not be exaggerated.Here,
asset prices must move, altering both yields and valuations of
existing holdings. These changes in prices may not be confined to
the stock market and other markets in existing assets, but may
spread also into GNP markets, with repercussions on economic
activity and with feedbacks to the financial sector.
The specific examples Duesenberry gives of financial adjustment
mechanisms underline the arbitrariness of institutions. That some
institutions will arise to accomplish such adjustments is predictable.
Why certain ones arise and others do not is hard to explain. Equally
good rationalizations could be provided for institutional set-ups
quite different from those which characterize the United States
money market today. For example, why do not corporate borrowers
create more open-market paper? Why is bank lending to government
securities dealers so expensive here, compared to London? There is,
perhaps, a scarcity in the supply of institutional mechanisms; so
only a few of those that might logically arise actually do. But a given
set of institutions will not last forever if circumstances change, and
neither theorists nor policy makers should rely too heavily or too
long on peculiarities of the current institutional structure.
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